

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

JOE YOUNG, individually and on behalf)
of all others similarly situated,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.) No. 2018CH13114
)
TRI CITY FOODS, INC., a Delaware) Calendar 15
corporation,)
)
Defendant.)

12340305

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES
TO PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

For its Answer and Affirmative and Other Defenses to plaintiff Joe Young’s (“plaintiff”) Class Action Complaint, defendant Tri City Foods, Inc. (“TCF” or “defendant”), states as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Defendant Tri City is a franchisee of the Burger King restaurant chain.

ANSWER: Defendant admits the allegations in Paragraph 1.

2. When employees first begin their jobs at one of Tri City’s restaurants, they are required to scan their fingerprints in its time clocks. That’s because Tri City uses a biometric time tracking system that requires employees to use their fingerprints as a means of authentication, instead of key fobs or identification cards.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 2.

3. While there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks in the workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or identification cards—which can be changed or replaced if stolen or compromised—fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed, employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and unauthorized tracking.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 4.

4. Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from situations like these, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, *et seq.* (“BIPA”), specifically to regulate companies that collect and store Illinois citizens’ biometrics, such as fingerprints.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 *et seq.* (“BIPA”), to regulate *inter alia* the collection and storage of biometric identifiers and biometric information but denies that Paragraph 4 accurately describes the General Assembly’s legislative intent. The statutory language and legislative history speak for themselves.

5. Despite this law, Tri City disregards its employees’ statutorily protected privacy rights and unlawfully collects, stores, and uses their biometric data in violation of the BIPA. Specifically, Tri City has violated (and continues to violate) the BIPA because it did not (and continues not to):

- Properly inform Plaintiff and the Class members in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which their fingerprints were being collected, stored, and used, as required by the BIPA;
- Provide a publicly available retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ fingerprints, as required by the BIPA; nor
- Receive a written release from Plaintiff or the members of the Class to collect, capture, or otherwise obtain their fingerprints, as required by the BIPA.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 5.

6. Accordingly, this Complaint seeks an Order: (i) declaring that Defendant’s conduct violates BIPA; (ii) requiring Defendant to cease the unlawful activities discussed herein; and (iii) awarding liquidated damages to Plaintiff and the proposed Class.

ANSWER: Defendant denies that plaintiff is entitled to any of the requested relief and respectfully requests the Court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, enter judgment in defendant’s favor, and award defendant its costs and attorneys’ fees and any such further relief as this Court deems appropriate.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff Joe Young is a natural person and citizen of the State of Illinois.

ANSWER: Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 7 and, therefore, denies them.

8. Defendant Tri City Foods, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at 1400 Opus Place, Suite 900, Downers Grove, Illinois 60515.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that TCF is a Delaware corporation with an office at 1400 Opus Place, Suite 900, Downers Gove, Illinois 60515. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 8.

9. Respondent in Discovery NCR Corporation (“NCR”) provides Defendant Tri City Foods with the hardware and software for its employee time tracking service. As such, Plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe that NCR possesses information essential to determine proper additional defendants in this action. For instance, Plaintiff believes NCR possesses information that can identify additional individuals or entities that may have collected, used, and stored Plaintiff’s and the putative Class members’ biometric information.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that it uses Point of Sale (“POS”) devices sold by NCR Corporation but denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 9. Plaintiff dismissed NCR Corporation as a respondent in discovery because NCR does not collect, use or store plaintiff’s or the putative class members’ biometric information or possess information essential to determine additional defendants in this action.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-209 because Defendant conducts business transactions in Illinois, owns and operates restaurants in Illinois, and has committed tortious acts in Illinois.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that this Court has jurisdiction over this action because it conducts business within the State and owns and operates restaurants in Illinois but denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 10.

11. Venue is proper in Cook County because Defendant conducts business transactions in Cook County, and the events giving rise to this claim occurred in Cook County.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that venue is proper in Cook County because defendant conducts business within the county but denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 11.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. The Biometric Information Privacy Act.

12. In the early 2000's, major national corporations started using Chicago and other locations in Illinois to test "new [consumer] applications of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias." 740 ILCS 14/5(b). Given its relative infancy, an overwhelming portion of the public became weary of this then-growing, yet unregulated technology. *See* 740 ILCS 14/5.

ANSWER: Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 12 and, therefore, denies them.

13. In late 2007, a biometrics company called Pay By Touch—which provided major retailers throughout the State of Illinois with fingerprint scanners to facilitate consumer transactions—filed for bankruptcy. That bankruptcy was alarming to the Illinois Legislature because suddenly there was a serious risk that millions of fingerprint records—which, are unique biometric identifiers, can be linked to people's sensitive financial and personal data—could now be sold, distributed, or otherwise shared through the bankruptcy proceedings without adequate protections for Illinois citizens. The bankruptcy also highlighted the fact that most consumers who had used that company's fingerprint scanners were completely unaware that the scanners were not actually transmitting fingerprint data to the retailer who deployed the scanner, but rather to the now-bankrupt company, and that their unique biometric identifiers could now be sold to unknown third parties.

ANSWER: Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 13 and, therefore, denies them.

14. Recognizing the "very serious need [for] protections for the citizens of Illinois when it [came to their] biometric information," Illinois enacted the BIPA in 2008. *See* Illinois House Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276; 740 ILCS 14/5.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that Illinois enacted BIPA in 2008 and that Paragraph 14 quotes a few words from 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276 but denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 14.

15. The BIPA is an informed consent statute which achieves its goal by making it unlawful for a company to, among other things, "collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it *first*:

- (1) informs the subject ... in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored;

- (2) informs the subject ... in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and
- (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information.”

740 ILCS 14/15(b).

ANSWER: Paragraph 15 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 15. The statute speaks for itself.

16. BIPA specifically applies to employees who work in the State of Illinois. BIPA defines a “written release” specifically “in the context of employment [as] a release executed by an employee as a condition of employment.” 740 ILCS 14/10.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that BIPA applies to some employees who work in Illinois but denies that BIPA applies to employees of financial institutions, to employees of state or local government agencies, or to employees of government contractors. Defendant further admits that plaintiff quoted a portion of the definition of “written release” in 740 ILCS 14/10 but denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 16.

17. Biometric identifiers include retina and iris scans, voiceprints, scans of hand and face geometry, and—most importantly here—fingerprints. *See* 740 ILCS 14/10. Biometric information is separately defined to include any information based on an individual’s biometric identifier that is used to identify an individual. *See id.*

ANSWER: Paragraph 17 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 17. The statute speaks for itself.

18. The BIPA also establishes standards for how employers must handle Illinois employees’ biometric identifiers and biometric information. *See* 740 ILCS 14/15(c)—(d). For instance, the BIPA requires companies to develop and comply with a written policy—made available to the public—establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within three years of the individual’s last interaction with the company, whichever occurs first. 740 ILCS 14/15(a).

ANSWER: Paragraph 18 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 18. The statute speaks for itself.

19. Ultimately, the BIPA is simply an informed consent statute. Its narrowly tailored provisions place no absolute bar on the collection, sending, transmitting, or communicating of biometric data. For example, the BIPA does not limit what kinds of biometric data may be collected, sent, transmitted, or stored. Nor does the BIPA limit to whom biometric data may be collected, sent, transmitted, or stored. The BIPA simply mandates that entities wishing to engage in that conduct must make proper disclosures and implement certain reasonable safeguards.

ANSWER: Paragraph 19 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 19. The statute speaks for itself.

II. Tri City Foods Violates the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

20. By the time the BIPA passed through the Illinois Legislature in mid-2008, many companies who had experimented using biometric data as an authentication method stopped doing so. That is because Pay By Touch's bankruptcy, described in Section I above, was widely publicized and brought attention to consumers' discomfort with the use of their biometric data.

ANSWER: Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 20 and, therefore, denies them.

21. Unfortunately, Tri City failed to take note of the trend recognizing the dangers in storing biometric identifiers and the passage of Illinois law governing the collection and use of biometric data. Tri City continues to collect, store, and use its employees' biometric data in violation of the BIPA.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 21.

22. Specifically, when employees first begin work at Tri City, they are required to have their fingerprints scanned in order to enroll them in its fingerprint database.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 22.

23. Tri City uses an employee time tracking system that requires employees to use their fingerprints as a means of authentication. Unlike a traditional time clock, employees have to use their fingerprints to "punch" in to or out of work.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 23.

24. Unfortunately, Tri City fails to inform its employees the extent of the purposes for which it collects their sensitive biometric data or to whom the data is disclosed, if at all.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 24.

25. Tri City similarly fails to provide its employees with a written, publicly available policy identifying its retention schedule, and guidelines for permanently destroying its employees' fingerprints when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining their fingerprints is no longer relevant, as required by the BIPA. An employee who leaves the company does so without any knowledge of when their biometric identifiers will be removed from Tri City's databases—or if they ever will be.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 25.

26. The Pay By Touch bankruptcy that catalyzed the passage of the BIPA highlights why conduct such as Tri City's—whose employees are aware that they are providing biometric identifiers but are not aware of to whom or the full extent of the reasons they are doing so—is so dangerous. That bankruptcy spurred Illinois citizens and legislators into realizing a critical point: it is crucial for people to understand when providing biometric data who exactly is collecting it, who it will be transmitted to, for what purposes, and for how long. But Tri City disregards these obligations, and instead unlawfully collects, stores, and uses its employees' biometric identifiers and information.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 26.

27. Ultimately, Tri City disregards its employees' statutorily protected privacy rights by violating the BIPA.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 27.

FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF YOUNG

28. Plaintiff Young worked for Tri City from July 2017 through January 2018 at one of Tri City's restaurants in Cook County.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that TCF hired Young in July 2017, and denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 28.

29. As a new employee, Tri City required Young to scan his fingerprint so that it could use it as an authentication method to track his time. Tri City subsequently stored Young's fingerprint data in its databases.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 29.

30. Each time Young began and ended his workday he was required to scan his fingerprint.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 30.

31. Tri City never informed Young of the specific limited purposes or length of time for which it collected, stored, or used his fingerprint.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 31.

32. Similarly, Tri City never informed Young of any biometric data retention policy it developed, nor whether it will ever permanently delete his fingerprint.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 32.

33. Young never signed a written release allowing Tri City to collect or store his fingerprint.

ANSWER: Defendant denies that it collected or stored plaintiff's fingerprint and therefore denies the allegations of Paragraph 33.

34. Young has continuously and repeatedly been exposed to the risks and harmful conditions created by Tri City's violations of the BIPA alleged herein.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 34.

35. Plaintiff seeks liquidated damages under BIPA as compensation for the injuries Tri City has caused.

ANSWER: Defendant denies that it injured plaintiff or that he is entitled to the requested relief.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

36. **Class Definition:** Plaintiff Joe Young brings this action pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801 on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows:

All residents of the State of Illinois who had their biometric identifiers or biometric information collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed by Tri City while residing in Illinois.

The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant's subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons.

ANSWER: Defendant admits only that plaintiff asserts class action claims and denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 36.

37. **Numerosity:** The exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Defendant has collected, captured, received, or otherwise obtained biometric identifiers or biometric information from at least hundreds of employees who fall into the definition of the Class. Ultimately, the Class members will be easily identified through Defendant's records.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 37.

38. **Commonality and Predominance:** There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

- a) whether Defendant collected, captured, or otherwise obtained Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers or biometric information;
- b) whether Defendant properly informed Plaintiff and the Class of its purposes for collecting, using, and storing their biometric identifiers or biometric information;
- c) whether Defendant obtained a written release (as defined in 740 ILCS 14/10) to collect, use, and store Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers or biometric information;
- d) whether Defendant has sold, leased, traded, or otherwise profited from Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers or biometric information;
- e) whether Defendant developed a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within three years of their last interaction, whichever occurs first;
- f) whether Defendant complies with any such written policy (if one exists); and
- g) whether Defendant used Plaintiff's and the Class's fingerprints to identify them.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 38.

39. **Adequate Representation:** Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 39.

40. **Appropriateness:** This class action is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are superior to all others available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class are likely to have been small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant's wrongful conduct. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant's misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in their Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 40.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of 740 ILCS 14/1, *et seq.* (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

41. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

ANSWER: Defendant restates and incorporates its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 40 as if fully set forth herein.

42. The BIPA requires companies to obtain informed written consent from employees before acquiring their biometric data. Specifically, the BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to "collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless [the entity] first: (1) informs the subject . . in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; *and* (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information...." 740 ILCS 14115(b) (emphasis added).

ANSWER: Paragraph 42 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 42. The statute speaks for itself.

43. The BIPA also mandates that companies in possession of biometric data establish and maintain a satisfactory biometric data retention (and—importantly--deletion) policy. Specifically, those companies must: (i) make publicly available a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanent deletion of biometric data (*i.e.*, when the employment relationship ends); and (ii) actually adhere to that retention schedule and actually delete the biometric information. *See* 740 ILCS 14/15(a).

ANSWER: Paragraph 43 sets forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 43. The statute speaks for itself.

44. Unfortunately, Tri City fails to comply with these BIPA mandates.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 44.

45. Tri City Foods is a corporation and thus qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. *See* 740 ILCS 14/10.

ANSWER: Defendant admits the allegations in Paragraph 45.

46. Plaintiff and the Class are individuals who had their “biometric identifiers” collected by Tri City (in the form of their fingerprints), as explained in detail in Section II. *See* 740 ILCS 14/10.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 46.

47. Plaintiff’s and the Class’s biometric identifiers or information based on those biometric identifiers were used to identify them, constituting “biometric information” as defined by the BIPA. *See* 740 ILCS 14/10.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 47.

48. Tri City violated 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3) by negligently failing to obtain written releases from Plaintiff and the Class before it collected, used, and stored their biometric identifiers and biometric information.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 48.

49. Tri City violated 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1) by negligently failing to inform Plaintiff and the Class in writing that their biometric identifiers and biometric information were being collected and stored.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 49.

50. Tri City violated 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(2) by negligently failing to inform Plaintiff and the Class in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric identifiers or biometric information was being collected, stored, and used.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 50.

51. Tri City violated 740 ILCS 14/15(a) by negligently failing to publicly provide a retention schedule or guideline for permanently destroying its employees' biometric identifiers and biometric information.

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 51.

52. By negligently collecting, storing, and using Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein, Tri City violated Plaintiff's and the Class's rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth in the BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1, *et seq.*

ANSWER: Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 52.

53. On behalf of himself and the Class, Plaintiff seeks: (1) injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiff and the Class by requiring Defendant to comply with the BIPA's requirements for the collection, storage, and use of biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein; (2) liquidated damages of \$1,000 per violation for each of Defendant's negligent violations of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3).

ANSWER: Defendant denies that plaintiff is entitled to any of the requested relief and respectfully requests the Court to dismiss plaintiff's claims with prejudice, enter judgment in defendant's favor, and award defendant its costs and attorneys' fees and any such further relief as this Court deems appropriate.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Joe Young, on behalf of himself and the Class, respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order:

- A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, appointing Plaintiff Young as representative of the Class, and appointing his counsel as Class Counsel;

- B. Declaring that Defendant's actions, as set out above, violate the BIPA;
- C. Awarding statutory damages of \$1,000 for each of Defendant's violations of the BIPA, pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1);
- D. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of the Class, including an Order requiring Defendant to collect, store, and use biometric identifiers or biometric information in compliance with the BIPA;
- F. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys' fees;
- G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable; and
- H. Awarding such other and further relief as equity and justice may require.

ANSWER: Defendant denies that plaintiff is entitled to any of his requested relief and respectfully requests the Court to dismiss plaintiff's claims with prejudice, enter judgment in defendant's favor, and award defendant its costs and attorneys' fees and any such further relief as this Court deems appropriate.

JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable.

ANSWER: Defendant admits that plaintiff requested a trial by jury but denies that BIPA provides for a jury trial or that plaintiff's claims are entitled to reach trial.

AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES

Defendant submits the following affirmative and other defenses to the Class Action Complaint. By pleading these defenses, defendant does not alter the burden of proof and/or burden of persuasion that exists with respect to any issues in this lawsuit. Moreover, all defenses are pled in the alternative and do not constitute an admission of liability or an admission that plaintiff or any member of the putative class is entitled to any relief whatsoever.

1. Defendant does not possess biometric identifiers or biometric information, and therefore, defendant is not required to comply with 740 ILCS 14/15(a).

2. Plaintiff has no standing to bring his Section 15(a) claim because he failed to allege (and cannot) allege a required injury-in-fact to any cognizable personal or property interest such as defendant's failure to timely destroy his alleged biometric data.

3. Defendant timely destroyed plaintiff's alleged biometric data, which moots his Section 15(a) claim.

4. Defendant does not collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain any biometric identifiers or biometric information, as defined under BIPA, and therefore, defendant is not required to comply with 740 ILCS 14/15(b).

5. The Class Action Complaint is barred in whole or in part because plaintiff and the putative class members implicitly or expressly consented to the conduct now alleged to violate BIPA because they knowingly and repeatedly used the scanner each day they worked.

6. The Class Action Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of estoppel, waiver, ratification and acquiescence. Plaintiff and the putative class members knew they were using a finger scanner but did nothing to object, complain or seek to opt out of its use.

7. Plaintiff's and the putative class' purported injuries were accidental, occurred in the workplace, arising out of their employment, and are compensable under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, plaintiff's and the putative class' claims are preempted or otherwise barred by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, which provides the exclusive remedy for injuries that arise in the workplace or in connection with employment.

8. To the extent plaintiff alleges violations of Section 15(b) of BIPA, plaintiff's claims accrued with defendant's first collection and first dissemination without allegedly complying with Section 15's requirements.

9. Plaintiff's and the putative class' claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13-201, to the extent their claims were not brought within this one-year period.

10. The applicable putative class members' claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, to the extent their claims were not brought within this two-year period.

11. The applicable putative class members' claims are barred by the five-year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13-205, if applicable, to the extent their claims were not brought within this five-year period.

12. The claims are barred in whole or in part by defendant's good faith, and the absence of negligent, intentional or reckless conduct. To the extent that BIPA applies to defendant's conduct, defendant is not liable because it relied in good faith upon a reasonable interpretation of BIPA's statutory language and any alleged violation was not negligent, intentional, or reckless.

13. The Class Action Complaint is barred in whole or in part because defendant substantially complied with BIPA.

14. Plaintiff and the putative class members have not suffered any harm as a result of the conduct alleged. The statutory damages potentially available under BIPA are grossly excessive and disproportionate in light of the absence of any injury or harm to plaintiff and the putative class members. Therefore, any award of statutory damages to plaintiff or the putative class members would violate defendant's due process rights under the Illinois and/or United States Constitutions and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. *See* IL Const., Art. I, §2; U.S. Const. Amend. V, VIII and XXIV.

15. To the extent that plaintiff and the putative class members suffered an alleged injury, they are subject to Illinois' "single recovery rule," which permits an individual to recover only once for a single, indivisible injury.

16. Plaintiff and the putative class had actual or constructive knowledge of the risks inherent in their use of a time-tracking system to clock in and clock out for work. Nonetheless, plaintiff and the putative class voluntarily undertook such risks and to the extent that plaintiff and the putative class suffered any injury, the proximate cause of such injury was not a negligent action or omission by defendant.

17. Plaintiff and/or the putative class members do not satisfy the requirements of 735 ILCS § 2-801, and thus, plaintiff's claims are not appropriate for class action treatment.

18. Defendant reserves the right to amend its defenses or add additional defenses in the event that discovery or developments in the law indicate they would be appropriate.

DATED: February 24, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Anne E. Larson
One of the Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney certifies that on February 24, 2021, she filed the foregoing ***Answer and Affirmative and Other Defenses to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint*** electronically with the Clerk of Court using the ECF system, which will send electronic notification to the following:

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